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THOMAS BRACKETT REED

“Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed: American Statesman.’'
1896 photograph by Parker, Washington, D. C. published in Samuel W. McCall,

The Life of Thomas Brackett Reed
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin 8c Co., 1914), frontispiece.

THOMAS BRACKETT REED, CIVIL
RIGHTS, AND THE FIGHT FOR
FAIR ELECTIONS
BY WENDY HAZARD
Few causes in American history have proved more enduring than
the effort to ensure all citizens the right to vote. From the enfranchis
ing o f African-Americans after the Civil War to the granting o f
womens suffrage and the passage o f the Voting Rights Act in 1965,
the country has struggled to live up to its image as the guardian o f
the ideal that every citizen has a guaranteed right to vote. The pro
longed presidential election o f 2000 and the vote-counting debacle in
Florida once again focused national attention on the issue o f enfran
chisement. Democrats argued that the Florida election, whether by
accident or design, was hopelessly flawed. The NAACP and other
civil rights organizations produced evidence o f confusing ballots,
scrubbed voter lists, and lost registration forms, all o f which, they be
lieve, conspired to deny African-Americans and other minorities
their voting rights. Calls for federal action and electoral reform have
reverberated through the halls o f Congress ever since.
The arguments o f reformers today resonate with the language
and concerns o f an earlier time. In 1889-1890, advocates o f electoral
reform, most o f whom were then Republicans, made a valiant, but
ultimately abortive, effort to protect the voting rights o f AfricanAmericans in southern states. At a time when southern redeemers
were seeking to obliterate the memory o f Reconstruction and deny
blacks any role in the political life o f the South, the leadership o f the
Republican party was determined to strengthen the federal govern
ment's role in protecting the rights o f its citizens.
Maine Congressman and Speaker o f the House Thomas Brackett
Reed presided over this burst o f congressional energy for electoral re
form and black suffrage. This paper traces Speaker Reed’s commit
ment to that effort, and examines the form idable skills he brought to
bear to win passage o f a federal elections bill in the House o f Repre
sentatives in 1890. The bill was ultimately defeated in the Senate— a
watershed moment that signaled the end o f the Republican party’s
and northern politicians’ concern for issues that had dominated na
tional politics since the end o f the Civil War. It was to be the last sus
tained effort to protect African-Americans’ voting rights until the
Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, the march on Selma, and the
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passage o f the Voting Rights Act o f 1965. Reed's efforts throughout
the long and highly charged debate between 1889 and 1890 rank
among the greatest o f his long and extraordinary career.
Wendy Hazard is an assistant professor o f history at the Univer
sity o f Maine, Augusta where she specializes in twentieth-century
American political history.

W

HEN THE Fifty-first Congress opened in December 1889,
the Republican party was in a position for the first time in
fourteen years to set the national agenda. When the votes of
the election of November 1888 were counted, Republicans had won con
trol of both the Congress and the presidency, and had broken a party
deadlock that had stifled legislative action for years. But the margin of
victory had been razor-thin. The new president, Benjamin Harrison, had
lost the popular vote to Grover Cleveland, but won his election in the
electoral college by a vote that hung on returns from his home state of
Indiana. Republicans in the House held a slim eight-vote majority,
barely enough to allow them to constitute a quorum.1
Republican leaders were understandably eager to use their advan
tage, slim as it was, to take firm control of the legislative process early in
the session, and pass laws that would further their party's agenda and in
crease its strength in coming elections. They had campaigned for fiscal
and tariff reforms, and were determined to enact legislation that they
believed would strengthen the economy and protect the nation s indus
tries and farms from foreign competition. Of equal importance to the
party’s leadership was the enactment of civil rights legislation to protect
the rights of African-American voters and ensure fair elections in the
South. These were moral concerns that had been at the heart of Republi
can politics since the party’s inception. But by this time, they were polit
ical concerns as well. Republicans were convinced that violence, voter in
timidation, and systematic fraud had been responsible for Republican
losses in the deep South since the end of Reconstruction.
A Senate investigation of disturbances in the 1886 congressional
elections in Washington County, Texas, revealed the lynching of blacks
and the forced expulsion of three white Republicans from the state.2
Elaborate extra-legal devices aimed at disenfranchising African-Ameri
can voters loyal to the Republican party were also widespread. They in
cluded the stuffing of ballot boxes, tampering with returns, doctoring
registration rolls, changing polling places without prior notification, and
locating the polls miles from where African-Americans lived.3 All these
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methods had conspired successfully to consign a virtually solid South to
the Democratic party Republicans were determined to find the means
to end these methods and to reassert their party’s viability in the South.
President Harrison signaled his party’s rekindled concern for fair
elections and the rights of African-American voters in his inaugural ad
dress. “The freedom of the ballot is a condition of our national life, and
no power invested in the Congress or in the Executive to secure or per
petuate it should remain unused upon occasion.”4 In his first annual
message to Congress in 1899, Harrison spoke of the “disgrace” that sul
lied the reputation of the entire nation. “Colored people had by various
devices been deprived of any effective exercise of their civil rights,” he
said. He called on Congress to enact “such measures within its well-de
fined constitutional powers as will secure to all people a free exercise of
suffrage and every other civil right under the Constitution and laws of
the United States.” 5 Democrats had reason to be concerned. Republicans
knew that the success of their legislative agenda in the Fifty-first Con
gress would depend on the firmness and determination of the new
Speaker of the House. In Thomas Brackett Reed of Maine they had their
man. A fiercely partisan Republican, a brilliant debater, and a man of
formidable intellect, Reed had earned his colleagues’ esteem for his mas
tery of legislative tactics and parliamentary procedure. The Republican
caucus elected him Speaker when Congress opened in December, con
vinced that he would provide the party with strong leadership. “The
danger in a free country,” Reed told a Philadelphia audience shortly after
his election, “is not that power will be exercised too freely, but that it will
be exercised too sparingly” 6 He was clearly eager for the job, ready to
tackle head-on any Democratic efforts to obstruct the Republican
agenda, and confident that he could bring discipline to the legislative
process.
In 1889, Reed was fifty years old. He had entered Congress in 1877,
and since that time had perfected his knowledge of the intricacies of
House procedure and parliamentary device. Henry Cabot Lodge, who
served with Reed for seven years in the House, and who had campaigned
for his election, said of him, “In my professional opinion, there has never
been a more perfectly equipped leader in any parliamentary body at any
time.” 7 At 6 feet 3 inches tall, and nearly 300 pounds, Reed made an un
forgettable visual impression that inspired both fear and respect in his
fellow politicians. “A stupendous figure— indeed Brobdingnagian . . .
and ambitious as Lucifer,” said Champ Clark. A “human frigate among
shallops,” said another.8 Reed’s sarcastic wit was also legendary and he
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was never reluctant to use it. Democrats were his favorite target. When
one Democratic orator completed a particularly long-winded speech in
which he grandly stated that he would rather be right than president,
Reed retorted, “The gentleman need not be disturbed. He will never be
either/' Of another, he remarked, “The gentleman never rises to speak
without subtracting from the total sum of human knowledge." The De
mocratic party, he said, was but a “hopeless assortment of discord and
differences, as incapable of positive action as it is capable of infinite
clamor." By contrast, the Republicans were poised to become the great
party of the future. “Progress is the essence of Republicanism. To have
met the great emergencies as they arose has been our history. To meet
emergencies as they shall arise must be our daily walk and duty, or we
shall cease to be."9
On a number of key issues, Reed was a down-the-line conservative
New England Republican. He dismissed the Greenback, Populist, and
Democratic planks on currency as dangerously inflationary. He sup
ported high protective tariffs as the “solution to the ills of society," and
the best way to protect American workers against foreign competition.
And he embraced a laissez-faire attitude toward the trusts, assailing ac
tions to curtail them as counterproductive, comparing them to “a bear
who tried to kill a fly with a stone and ended up killing his friend in
stead.” 10 Reed was also no friend of organized labor. Ralph Beaumont,
chairman of the Congressional Legislative Committee of the Knights of
Labor, who campaigned in Maine against Reed's reelection in 1886, said
of Reed, “he is corporation every time . . . there isn't a man in the United
States whose election would be so dangerous to the labor cause."11

Reed Champions Federal Control o f Elections
White southerners, wary of Republican talk of new laws that threat
ened federal oversight of their elections, hoped that Reed’s ties to north
ern industrialists and his advocacy for a strong protective tariff would
keep Reed from launching “a new crusade against the South." J. L. M.
Curry of Alabama hoped that “the fact that Northern men, mainly Re
publicans, own our Railroads in the South and are largely invested in
manufacturing and mining may save us from Negro rule. Their pecu
niary interest may make them conservative."12 Senator John Tyler Mor
gan of Alabama agreed with Curry and predicted that “we will get away
without a fusillade on the Negro question---- [P]rotectionists want mar
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kets, and the silver men want free coinage, and these and other craving
people want the help of the South against their own people, and they
prefer to leave the Negro to work out his own salvation, rather than lose
money. Money, my dear friend, is the real power in American politics at
this day. I am glad to have its shelter, just now, when it is the most effi
cient barrier to a new descent upon the South” 13
Democrats had some reason to be hopeful that Reed would not dis
appoint them. Early in the campaign of 1888, he had joined with other
leading Republicans in supporting a shift in traditional Republican cam
paign strategy for the South. The new strategy had sought to downplay
the “bloody shirt” rhetoric of past campaigns that recalled Republican
sacrifices for the Civil War, abolition, and racial justice, and emphasized
instead the benefits of Republican tariff reform for southern businesses.
White southern Republicans had argued that the earlier strategy had
alienated white voters, and had been ably exploited by Democrats who
fanned white fears of a return to Reconstruction and “Negro Rule”
under Republican leadership. A strong tariff and the promise of eco
nomic development would, they argued, overcome the legacy of section
alism and firmly unite businessmen in both the North and South for the
first time since the Civil War. Reasoning that blacks would stay loyal to
the party of Lincoln come what may, Reed, along with other prominent
Republicans, had backed the candidacy of former Confederate general
William Mahone for governor of Virginia.14
Mahone, a recent convert to the Republican party was eager to dis
tance the party from its past and reconstitute it as one concerned solely
with promoting the interests of southern industrialists and business
owners. He had discouraged black candidates for political office, suc
ceeded in removing a number of blacks from jobs inside the party's or
ganization, and promoted the Republican protectionist, pro-business
platform for its appeal to southern merchants and factory owners who
had nothing in common, he said, with the Bourbon planter elites who
controlled the Democratic party. His supporters were enthusiastic about
Mahone's chances for victory.15 Republican congressman Leonidas
Houk of Tennessee said, “Mahone's wonderful leadership in Virginia has
brought 60,000 Confederate soldiers, men of character and intelligence,
into the Republican ranks in that State.. . . With all the questions grow
ing out of the war removed, three out of five Democrats are with us.”
Despite the protests of African-Americans in Virginia, Reed had been
sufficiently impressed by these arguments to travel to Virginia and sup
port Mahones bid for the governorship.16
On election day, however, Mahone lost his race by over 40,000 votes.

6

Maine History

It was a resounding defeat that sent shock waves through the Republican
party. “We’ve been robbed ” said one Virginia Republican. In letters to
the party leadership, others described how Democratic registrars had
stricken the names of approximately 20,000 registered voters on the Sat
urday before the election, and that an additional 25,000 Republican
votes had not been counted.17 To Reed and fellow Republicans, the mes
sage was clear. Free and fair elections were not possible under the cur
rent system. Virginia, it turned out, was not alone. Evidence of corrup
tion, fraud, and physical intimidation in Arkansas, South Carolina, West
Virginia, Florida, and Alabama surfaced. In December 1889, eight blacks
were lynched in Barnwell County, South Carolina, and hundreds of oth
ers fled the state. In Florida, racial disturbances claimed the lives of sev
eral African-Americans and a federal marshal.18
Under the federal law, the governor of each state certified the win
ners of congressional elections, but defeated candidates had the right to
appeal the governor’s decision to the House of Representatives. Shortly
after the elections, appeals began to flood the House. In one case from
Arkansas, the committee on elections learned about a visiting Republi
can politician who had been attacked and killed by a mob before elec
tion day. On election day in the same state, in a county which had a ma
jority of black voters, masked men had stolen ballot boxes and a
Republican supervisor was shot. Despite the evidence of crime, the gov
ernor of Arkansas had certified the election of the Democratic candi
date.19 In South Carolina, the committee also looked into a case where
state officials had gerrymandered a district that stretched 200 miles, and
included parts of nine counties in which African-American voters out
numbered white voters five to one. The intention had clearly been to iso
late large numbers of black voters in a single district so as to ensure the
election of white Democrats in other counties. Reed commented bit
terly, “When South Carolina, by a gerrymander which remains up to
date the greatest spectacle that has ever been put on a map, and which to
this day almost defies belief, put 31,000 colored people (voters) . . in
one district with only 6,000 whites, the framers of the act meant at least
that that district should have the Representatives of its choice. But en
couraged by the success of the Southern plan elsewhere, even that dis
trict has been taken away. It is well known that in the South itself, this
was regarded as an outrage, but the voice of those so regarding it has
fallen into the silence of consent.” 20 He told a Pittsburgh audience the
following April, “For the past eight years no man has heard me in the
House or in the campaign discourse upon outrages or wrongs, murders,
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or shootings or hangings. But in recent elections, while physical intimi
dation may have been less than in the days when the KKK freely ram
paged through the South, ballot-box stuffing and cheating in the count
have taken its place” 21 Reed became convinced that the only remedy was
a law that would provide federal control of the nation's elections.
While Reed's renewed commitment to the civil rights and voting
rights of African-Americans may have been driven in part by partisan
political concerns, it was consistent with ideas that had long distin
guished him from many of his contemporaries. Reed was a firm believer
that the Constitution guaranteed equal protection for all Americans, re
gardless of race and gender. In 1884, well ahead of most members of the
Congress, and indeed of his generation, Reed had endorsed a Constitu
tional amendment to extend the suffrage to women. He ridiculed the ar
guments of opponents who pretended that by denying women the re
sponsibilities of full citizenship they sought only to protect women from
the harsh and ugly realities of political life. Reed sarcastically compared
these pretenses to arguments that southerners had once made about the
positive good of slavery. For these people, “the good of the African was
always the main object of slavery . . . and it was their own good, not bad
temper of their owners that was used to excuse severity of their treat
ment.” The political equality of women was opposed “by reasons drawn
almost entirely from a tender consideration for their own good.” “This
anxiety,” Reed said, “would be an honor to human nature were it not an
historical fact that the same sweet solicitude has been put up as a barrier
against every progress which women have made since civilization
began . . . We can better leave the sphere of women to the future than
confine it in the chains of the past.. . . Our government was founded on
the rule of all, and all are invited to assist in governing ”22 Four years
later, Reed, offended by the racist ferment against Chinese immigrants,
had broken ranks with the leadership of his own party and voted against
the Chinese Exclusion Bill. In 1890, however, the protection of AfricanAmerican voters was paramount and, signaling his intention to make
election reform a legislative priority, Reed appointed Massachusetts con
gressman Henry Cabot Lodge to chair a special committee on elections.
A friend of long standing, Lodge had campaigned hard for Reed's elec
tion as Speaker. In turn, Reed entrusted Lodge with crafting a federal
elections reform bill.
The Massachusetts Republican was keenly interested in the job. A
member of Boston's cultural-intellectual aristocracy, he could trace his
family lineage four or five generations back to the founding of the Mass
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achusetts Bay Colony. Lodge was also proud of the leading role Massa
chusetts had played in the anti-slavery movement, and saw himself as a
political descendent of John Quincy Adams and Charles Sumner. Like
Reed, he was a party loyalist and fierce partisan, a believer in a strong na
tional government, a protective tariff, and federal oversight of elections.
“If it is important to protect American industries, it is vastly more im
portant to protect American voters in their right to vote,” Lodge insisted.
The legitimacy of the American form of government was at stake. “It is
an oft-repeated truism that the purity ot the ballot lies at the very foun
dation of our government, but it is not equally well understood that
popular confidence in the verdict of the ballot-box is quite as important
as the honesty of the verdict itself. At the present time, it is believed,
rightly or wrongly, by large masses of the American people that there is
no such thing as a fair election in certain parts of the country.” Congress,
Lodge insisted, would be derelict in its duty if it failed to pass an effective
election law.23 With Reed's urging, and aware that there was competing
legislation being crafted by other House members, Lodge set to work in
early January.
At the same time, Reed was readying himself for what would be the
most significant and ultimately most celebrated battle of his political ca
reer. Under the Constitution, the House of Representatives was required
to act as the final tribunal for contested election cases. In January 1890,
nine contested cases crowded the House's legislative docket. Reed knew
that until they were cleared, the rest of the legislative agenda before the
Fifty-first Congress would be stymied. The first case concerned election
fraud and ballot box tampering in West Virginia and came from an
African-American congressional candidate who had lost his election the
previous November. Reed was well aware that Democrats would employ
all means in their power to stall a final determination on this and other
cases to prevent the certification and seating of Republican contestants.
To do this, they would resort to a favorite and familiar tactic known as
the “disappearing quorum” whereby the minority party could, under
House rules, prevent any legislation it opposed from coming to a vote by
demanding a roll call to determine if a quorum existed. When the roll
was called, they would remain silent when their names were read. Since
the rules required that a member's presence was determined by his voice
vote, and since it required a majority of the whole to constitute a quo
rum, the silent filibuster could effectively paralyze the legislative process
and prevent the House from enacting any business.24 Reed acidly re
ferred to the practice as “a system of metaphysics whereby a member
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could be present and absent at the same moment” He was determined to
end it. If he failed, he knew that the Democrats would continue to use
the disappearing quorum to obstruct any piece of legislation that the
Republican majority proposed. Their own wafer-thin majority in the
House, only three more than the number required to constitute quo
rum, made the Republicans especially vulnerable to what Reed called
"the tyranny of the minority” The fate of the Republican party's legisla
tive agenda for the Fifty-first Congress, including tariff revision and fed
eral control of elections, hung in the balance.
To Reed, however, the stakes were even higher. At risk was the per
manent crippling of the legislative process in the United States, and the
survival of representative democracy. He reasoned that if the Democrats
could block the legislation that Republicans, who by winning the elec
tion in 1888, could rightfully expect to enact, then they would effectively
undermine the fundamental principles of a representative govern
ment.25
On January 29, 1890, the House took up the West Virginia case. The
vote stood at 161 in favor of seating the Republican candidate, two op
posed and 165 Democrats defiantly denying quorum by sitting silent
and refusing to vote. Without flinching, Reed began reading into the
record the name of every Democrat he could see. Republicans ap
plauded, Democrats howled, and pandemonium ensued. Reed remained
steadfast, naming and counting. When one member protested, “I deny
your right, Mr. Speaker, to count me present!” Reed paused and calmly
responded, “the Chair is making a statement of fact that the gentleman is
present. Does he deny it?”26 Democrats ran for the exits and hid under
their desks. Reed ordered the doors locked and went on with his count.
At the end, he announced, “the Chair rules that there is a quorum pres
ent within the meaning of the Constitution.” 27 The votes were recorded
and counted and the Republicans had their victory. Shortly afterward,
the House Rules Committee, chaired by the Speaker himself, reported
out a new set of congressional rules. Known thereafter as “Reed's Rules,”
they provide that all members must vote; that one hundred shall consti
tute a quorum; that all present shall be counted; and that no dilatory
motion shall be entertained. The definition of what was “dilatory” was to
be left to the judgment of the Speaker.28 The new rules enhanced the
power of the Speaker to streamline consideration of issues on the floor,
and to appoint all the chairs of the standing committees.
The Republican press cheered. “Republicans make no mistake when
they declare that a filibustering minority shall not clog the wheels of leg-
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islation. This is the people’s contest and Speaker Reed has the country
behind him in his fearless stand for the right.” 29
Democrats, though, cried foul and denounced Speaker Reed as a
“cannibal autocrat,” “tyrant,” and “dictator” who had flagrantly abused
the powers of his office. Portland’s Daily Eastern Argus railed, “Speaker
Reed is playing the part of an enraged bull, madly rushing at the mata
dor and trampling things generally underfoot as he goes. His arbitrary
ruling that the Speaker has the power to count members as present,
though they have not themselves voted on the roll-call is condemned by
the highest parliamentary authorities . . . . Dictator Reed’s plan of count
ing in the opponents to carry legislative measures stands no chance of
endorsement by the Supreme Court” 30 A few days later, it opined,
“What is Reedism? It is the one man power. It has the touch and taste of
despotism.” 31
“Czar Reed” was the epithet most Democrats and their presses pre
ferred. Political cartoonists had a field day depicting Reed crowned and
sitting on a throne with a scepter for a gavel clutched in his fist. But par
liamentarians around the world applauded Reed for his courage, and a
few months later the Supreme Court upheld his ruling. The rules,
known thereafter as “Reed’s Rules,” were Reed’s most lasting legacy. They
have stood the test of time and remain in place today.
In 1890, the death of the “silent quorum” had immediate and practi
cal consequences, for it cleared the way for orderly deliberations on the
merits of the contested elections cases. Reed knew too that it also made
likely the passage of much of the Republican agenda, including tariff re
form, silver coinage, pensions for Civil War veterans, and, most impor
tant, a federal elections bill.
On February 3, the House took up the contested case from West Vir
ginia and, after weighing the evidence, voted to seat Republican con
gressman Smith. On February 4, the Republican press in Maine de
clared, “Justice Done,” and hailed the decision to seat the
African-American congressman “legally elected by the people, whose
election was stolen from him by the most bare-faced fraud.” The Bangor
Whig and Courier editorial gave full credit to Reed for the outcome. “It
was against this case that the Democrats sought to filibuster. Thanks to
the courageous action of the Speaker [the Democrats] efforts to prevent
its consideration have been futile.. . . His demeanor under the impotent
abuse of mouthing demagogues. . . has been superb throughout. He has
made the whole country his debtor in striking at the very vitals of the
dragon of filibustering that has wasted millions of public money and
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"Reed as the Czar, 1890," Published in Judge. Reed’s political opponents decried his
heavy-handed tactics. Political cartoonists often portrayed him as an overfed
monarch quashing— or in this case “extinguishing”—-dissent. Reprinted in William
A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.,
1930), 160.

been the most formidable enemy to legislation for the public interests.
No State has ever had greater reason to be proud than has Maine to be
proud today of the indomitable and intellectual power of the Speaker o f
the Fifty-first Congress.” 32 With Republicans riding high, the time had
come for broad federal elections legislation.
Lodge, whose committee had gathered testimony from a number o f
black and white Republicans, was ready with his bill. Others, including
Senate Republicans, were prepared with proposals of their own. The
Lodge Bill, reported out of committee in March, provided that one hun
dred voters in a congressional district, or fifty in a county, could demand
an investigation into alleged irregularities. It empowered federal courts
to appoint bipartisan panels with two registrars and four inspectors,
evenly divided between the two major parties. Federal judges were em 
powered to certify the winners of the elections.33
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A much tougher bill, drafted by Albion Tourgee, a former federal
judge, was introduced by Congressman Harrison Kelly of Kansas. It re
quired that all congressional districts be nearly equal in population, and
that district boundaries be drawn up by Congress rather than by the
states. Finally, it required that the federal government supervise every as
pect of the election process, from registration to certification.34
The Kelly-Tourgee Bill made the strongest initial impression on
Reed. In a speech in April 1890, Reed reiterated several of its key points.
“It seems to me that the only wise course is to take into Federal hands
the Federal elections. Let us cut lose from the state elections, do our own
registration, our own accounting and our own certification.” 35 Although
the speech startled many in his own party, it served as a clear warning
that Reed intended to use his powers as Speaker to enact a strong elec
tion law. The New York Tribune editorialized, “It seems at the first glance
an extreme statement, yet it is made by a political leader who has not
been in the habit of denouncing election outrages in the South, nor of
discussion of the race question in or out of season.”36
Reed followed up on the points made in his Pittsburgh speech with
an article for the influential North American Review that implied that the
Lodge Bill did not go far enough to ensure free and fair elections. “The
[Lodge] Supervisor Law is the subject of objection,” he wrote, “because
while it leaves the election in the hands of the States, it proposes to set
watchers over the state officials, and to use a kind of dual control liable
to all manner of friction.” Reed warned that it might incite “the very vio
lence which they are striving to avoid.” And he warned, “It would be as
suming a terrible responsibility to enact it.” Instead, Reed concluded,
“Let the country at once assume at least the count and the returns of its
own elections ” 37 In a letter to Albion Tourgee he wrote, “I am not at all
sure that we can get through an election law as you and I desire but there
has been much improvement in the feeling on the subject and better
ground for hope.” 38 Reed’s colleague, Maine senator William Frye, used
even stronger language. This elections bill, he declared, “is not one-tenth
part stringent enough ” Frye favored, if necessary, “putting a bayonet be
hind every ballot” to ensure that every man’s vote was “counted as he
casts it ”39
The idea of federally controlled elections, however, made little head
way, and was further damaged when a Republican senator from Massa
chusetts, George Frisbie Hoar, a leading advocate for election reform,
submitted a bill to the Senate that called only for federal supervision, not
control, of elections. Republican senator William Eaton Chandler from
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Pennsylvania, wrote to Reed indicating that he did not see support in the
Senate to pass a stronger law. “While my desires favor a much broader
law, than the extension of the Supervisor's law, yet I come down to the
latter as the one which we shall all be likely to concur in the last.” Chan
dler did, however, encourage Reed, and his colleagues in the House, to
pursue a more radical solution. “I do not see why the House may not, if
Republicans therein see fit to do so, pass a more radical law”40
In early June, Lodge submitted a bill that reflected an effort at com
promise. It created procedures to re-qualify voters who had arbitrarily
been stricken from registration lists, and, unlike the earlier Lodge Bill, it
authorized the appointment of three supervisors, no more than two of
whom could come from either political party. In addition, it authorized
the appointment in each state of three canvassers, not more than two of
whom could come from either political party. Federal judges would ap
point these canvassers directly.41 Many Republicans sensed the limita
tions of the bill, not the least of which was the concern that in the com
ing elections, the reliance on federal judges appointed to office by the
former Democratic President Grover Cleveland could compromise the
bill's intent.
A number of southern white Republicans also opposed what they
now called the “Force Bill,” predicting that it would “intensify race preju
dice and engender sectional hostility”42 They were joined by Mug
wumps, a group of mostly white, well-to-do Protestants in New Eng
land, Pennsylvania, and New York. Once members of the Republican
party, these influential northeastern elites had bolted the party in protest
over the corruption of party politics during Reconstruction, and the Re
publicans' reliance on “ignorant Negro voters” who they maintained
were too easily manipulated by Southern elites at election time. By 1890,
the Mugwumps were focused on civil service and tariff reform. They
wanted nothing more to do with efforts to protect the voting rights of
African-Americans and argued that the southern states should be al
lowed to run their own elections. The Mugwump-controlled press, in
cluding the New York Times, the Nationy and the Boston Globe, cam
paigned vigorously against the Lodge Bill. The New York Times dismissed
the bill with a headline, “What the Republicans Will Do To Keep in
Power.” It predicted, “The Lodge Bill, if it was destined to become a law,
would be a burden and an oppression. It would annoy the South, while it
would make necessary an expenditure for which taxation would be im
posed for party benefits. As there is little expectation that the bill will go
further than the Senate, it may turn out to be merely a measure upon
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which they can go to their constituents to prove that they were in tavor
of what they call, 'free and fair elections.’”43 The Boston Globe called the
bill a “conspiracy” by House Speaker Reed and Congressman Lodge "to
stifle the minority and enforce Republican ru le___Never has legislation
been carried on with such high-handed audacity” as it was in Congress
under "dictator Reed.”44
Even as the debate inside and outside Washington grew hotter, the
House caucus reported the Lodge Bill out of committee by a one-vote
majority. Using his newly acquired power as Speaker, Reed quickly re
ported the Lodge Bill to the full House and required that it come to a
vote within a week. "To the applause of the colored delegation in the
gallery,” and over the objections of every Democrat, the House accepted
Reed’s stipulations.43 The stage was set for debate on the most impor
tant civil rights legislation to come before Congress since the end of Re
construction. It was to be unusually bitter.
Lodge opened the debate by asserting that his bill was not sectional
or partisan in nature, and that its provisions would apply equally to all
regions. He admitted that fraud still existed in Northern elections, but
said that elections in the South presented a “far graver” problem. He had
no desire, he said, “to indulge in recriminations about the race question
in the South” because that issue was national, not sectional. "It is one in
which we are all concerned and for the right solution of which we shall
all be held responsible, whether we live in the North or the South . . . .
The government which has made the black man a citizen of the United
States is bound to protect him in all his rights as a citizen of the United
States.”46
John Hemphill from South Carolina made the first rebuttal with
language replete with the racist fury of southern redeemers. The Lodge
Bill, he said, “would destroy the tranquil nature of race relations in the
South by putting the colored man again in control of the Southern
States.” Speaking on behalf of white southerners, he boldly proclaimed,
"We know that we must either rule that country or leave it. Now, for my
self, before the people of the United States, and before God . . . . I swear
we will not leave it.”47 Hemphill sponsored an amendment to the Lodge
Bill which would have kept the power to certify elections in the hands of
state governors. Alexander Stuart of Virginia decried the Lodge Bill as
"hideous” and "appalling.” "Our government,” he said, “is no longer a
government of the people, through their representatives, but a corrupt
oligarchy working through its hirelings. I regard this bill as
treasonable.”48
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Even support within the Republican party was divided. James G.
Blaine, the powerful and influential Maine Republican who was serving
as Secretary of State in the Harrison Administration saw little value in
the bill. To him, economic interests and tariff reform were paramount.
The “Negro question,” he said, was dead. He maintained that the only
way for Republicans to build their strength was to forge ties with com
mercial interests in the South and the West. Any effort to stress other is
sues was political nonsense.49 On the other hand, there were southern
Republicans who advocated a tougher bill, or no bill at all. Congressman
Ewart of North Carolina called the Lodge Bill as “lame and impotent an
effort to patch up a system of double jurisdiction, a system of legislation
that has always been a failure and always will be a failure.” Any legisla
tion, he said, should empower the federal government to “take entire
control and supervision of national elections.” 50 Others, however, in
cluding Congressman Harrison Kelly, whose own much tougher bill had
been side-lined, decided to support the Lodge Bill as a first step to more
meaningful reform, “a step, even though it be a blunder, that will finally
bring the crisis that will surely bring the remedy.” 51 In a fiery speech,
Kelly challenged assertions that, if passed, the law would never be en
forced and warned of dire consequences if it were resisted. Any attempt
“to nullify this bill if it becomes a law . . . will surely bring on a conflict in
this country.” War was possible, and if it came, “blood would flow and
flow freely, but better rivers of it should flow and liberty survive than
that the conditions that have existed in many places in the South for a
quarter of a century should remain.”52
Reed agreed that the Lodge Bill would be hard to enforce in the
South, and he worried that it did nothing to remedy corruption in state
and local elections. But he concluded finally that it would be “very help
ful” in states like Virginia and North Carolina in elections for national
office. In his article in the North American Review, he made dear his be
lief that the elections bill was key to the success of the Republicans’
larger agenda. White southerners, he wrote, “could control their state
and municipal governments, for no power lodged in the federal govern
ment can prevent i t . . . . All we ask is that in national matters the major
ity of voters in this country may rule.53 By “national matters,” Reed was
referring to tariff legislation that he was keen to enact in the Fifty-first
Congress and for which he needed a solid Republican majority. A sym
pathetic editorial in the New York Herald made this point emphatically.
“Speaker Reed is right. Let the Southern Democrats carry out their the
ory of race domination if they will, in their own state and local politics,
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but when Congressmen are elected to represent the Nation and to vote
on questions affecting the industries and welfare of the American peo
ple, let there be a legal registry, honest counting of the ballots and a valid
certification of the elections. It is simply intolerable that the economic
policy of this Nation should be settled by members of Congress whose
seats have been gained by systematic cheating conducted for the purpose
of securing race domination in the South” 54
Democrats in the House submitted last-minute amendments and at
tempted a filibuster. But Reed enforced his rules against dilatory actions,
and with his aid, Lodge marshaled the bill’s supporters. Shortly after
9:00 on the evening of July 2, the Federal Election Bill passed the House
by strict party vote, 155-149, with twenty-four abstentions. Only two
Republicans broke ranks to vote with the opposition, a remarkable testa
ment to Reed’s engineering and skill. African-Americans who had
crowded the House galleries to witness the vote were elated. “For the Ne
gro in the United States, the year 1890 is destined to be the most impor
tant that elapsed since the Black man first touched . . . the ballot.”55 Re
publicans, of course, cheered. The Bangor Whig and Courier hailed the
vote as the climax of the most successful legislative season in decades.
“The Republican House can point to a record of achievement, unsur
passed . . . having under the leadership of Speaker Reed overthrown the
entrenched abuses of legislative obstruction and successfully dealt with
the great questions of tariff, silver coinage, pensions . . . and the enact
ment, finally, of laws to protect the right of every American citizen to
vote for the Representative of his choice.” 56
Democrats and Mugwumps bristled. The New York Evening Post
commented, “Speaker Reed has forced through the Federal Election Bill,
as it has been expected that he would do ever since he had it made a cau
cus measure.” But, the editors claimed, “While Reed is the House of Rep
resentatives, happily, he is not yet the whole Congress.”57 The battle was
on to win the bill’s passage in the Senate, and Reed was determined to
use his influence. He urged speedy action on the bill before the fall elec
tions and before momentum was lost. He wrote one Senate colleague,
“We must pass the bill in the Senate soon or our defeat is certain.” Re
publicans were hopeful. William McKinley wrote, “The Election Bill is
now pending in the Senate, under which, when enacted, as it will be in
the next session, every lawful citizen, rich or poor, native or foreignborn, white or black, will enjoy the right to cast one free ballot in public
elections and to have that ballot duly counted.”58 Looming over them
was a special state constitutional convention convened in Mississippi in
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“Reed as Master o f Congress 'appeared in the Republican political humor
magazine judge. Reprinted in William A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentar
ian ( New York: Dodd, Mead and Co. 1930), 240.

August. The delegates to that convention, all but four of them white, had
bluntly declared, “it was the purpose of the convention to restrict Negro
suffrage.” The Mississippi law that emerged clearly sought to disenfran
chise poor, illiterate blacks and circumvent any federal protection of the
Fifteenth Amendment. It required that every voter be able to read or in
terpret any section o f the Mississippi Constitution in the presence of lo
cal authorities before being able to cast his ballot. It also required that
voters pay a yearly two-dollar poll tax and provide receipts from the pre
vious two years as evidence ot payment.59 For African-American voters
in Mississippi, the message was clear. Race discrimination had the new
patina of state law. For Republican advocates o f federal elections control
in Congress, it prompted a new sense of urgency.
Democrats in the Senate, however, were determined to kill the Fed
eral Election Bill. Senate rules still allowed all the old tactics of filibuster
and delay, and without the kind o f determined leadership that Reed had
exercised in the House, the Senate’s business soon became bogged down
in party bickering. Republicans, eager to pass both a tariff reform bill
and the Federal Election Bill soon realized that they could not have both
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before the fall elections. Senate Democrats, hoping to divide the Repub
lican membership, indicated willingness to act on a tariff bill, if the Fed
eral Election Bill was delayed until after the election. Southern newspa
pers meanwhile played to the fears of Northern industrial interests,
calling for a boycott of Northern products if the Lodge Bill passed.60
Their strategy worked. Despite last minute efforts by President Harrison
to speed up consideration of the Federal Election Bill, Senate Republi
cans voted to take up the McKinley tariff bill and postpone considera
tion of the Lodge Bill until after the fall election. It was a fateful decision.
With the economy in a downward spiral, labor unrest escalating, and
farmers in open revolt against the power of eastern monopolies, the
1890 elections were a disaster for the Republican party. Despite, or per
haps because of the Republican majority's activism and success in the
Fifty-first Congress, Republican candidates were soundly defeated. Reed
won reelection in Maine, but Republicans lost elections in New England,
the Midwest, and on the Plains where they had traditionally been strong.
When the votes were counted, Reed had lost his Republican majority
and with it the speakership. Republicans held onto only eighty-eight
seats to the Democrats 235, and the Farmers' Alliance Peoples' party
four.
Democrats had successfully exploited southerners' fears of the
“Force Bill” and inflated their usual majorities in the South. They had
also campaigned hard against Reed, the “tyranny” of his rules, and the
activism of the Fifty-first Congress. Reed was bitter— bitter about the
outcome and bitter about the verdict that voters had delivered. “Human
nature seems incapable of prolonged virtue,” he said. “It is hard to keep
people always up to the Republican program.”61
The Federal Election Bill was not yet dead, however. President Harri
son and Republican advocates still hoped the Senate would enact a
strong law. But a reinvigorated Democratic party was prepared to do
battle. When Congress reconvened in January, Massachusetts Senator
George Frisbie Hoar moved to consider the Federal Election Bill. De
mocrats began to filibuster. When Republicans sought to close the de
bate, Senate Democrats used the tactic that Reed had so soundly de
stroyed in the House only months before. In the upper house, however,
the Democrats were able to leave the Senate chamber, time and again, to
prevent a quorum. Republican supporters of Hoar's bill tried repeatedly
to bring it to a vote, but to no avail. African-Americans in Washington
organized mass protests and lobbied Republican congressmen to keep
up the fight. But as the days ticked by, interest waned and support in Re
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publican circles dwindled. When a vote was finally taken, Republican
senators from Colorado and Nevada joined with Democrats to defeat
the Hoar Bill.
The struggle was finally over. With it died any sustained effort on the
part of the Congress to protect the voting rights or other civil rights of
African-Americans for another seventy years. One after another, each of
the southern states, certain they would not face federal government in
tervention, passed their own versions of the Mississippi law, and effec
tively disenfranchised millions of African-Americans. In the decade that
followed, instead of improved race relations that southern whites had
assured if the Federal Election Bill was not forced down their throats,
there was dramatic deterioration in all departments. The color line was
drawn and ferociously enforced. Laws segregating all public facilities
were enacted in every southern state, and lynching took a savage toll on
black lives. Racism and vicious stereotypes became part of the nation s
popular culture. For African-Americans, most of whom lived in the
South, the willingness of northern politicians to accept defeat on the
elections bill sent a clear and painful message. Their one-time friends in
the North had abandoned them and turned their attention elsewhere.
Lodge never again expressed interest in African-American civil rights.
Instead, he focused his attentions on foreign affairs, immigration, and
military preparedness. When the Republicans won control of the House
again in 1896, Reed was again elected Speaker. He soon found himself
out of step with the leadership of his party. Lodge, now senator from
Massachusetts had joined with other leading Republicans, including Re
publican president William McKinley and Navy secretary Theodore
Roosevelt to press for a vigorous foreign policy that in 1898 took the na
tion to war against Spain and annexed Hawaii. Reed opposed the war,
the annexation of Hawaii, and the militarization of American foreign
policy. In an article for the North American Review, “Empire Can Wait,”
Reed decried the expansionists’ rush to imitate European imperialists
and exert Americas control over people in distant lands. In making his
argument, he invoked core principles that had motivated his support for
the Federal Election Bill eight years earlier. To yield to the
“earth-hunger” raging among Europeans would, he said, “be a complete
departure from the maxims of the illustrious founders of the Repub
lic.”62 Among those maxims, Reed declared, was the right of people to
live under a government of their own choosing. It was the same right he
had insisted on for African-Americans, and for American women as
well, a right that was at the heart of American Constitution, and the es
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sential premise upon which the government was built. Reed resigned his
office in 1899 rather than participate in the rush to empire and the con
quest of the Philippines. He died three years later. Although he had lost
some of the most important fights of his career, he was not a pessimistic
man. He believed to the end that he had stood for progress and on the
right side of history. In a speech at the Bowdoin centennial delivered not
long before his death, Reed expressed what may be the most eloquent
summary of his career.
“Justice, equality and the rights of man have an ever increasing sway.
Whatever contribution any man makes to humanity and justice will not
be lost, but will be gathered up and be among the treasures of the
Almighty.”63
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